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SUMMARY 
 
Europe’s market for services is fragmented by many regulatory barriers. The 
Services directive proposed by the European Commission aims to integrate 
national services markets by reducing these barriers. Several studies indicate 
that bilateral trade and foreign direct investment in services could boost 
substantially. GDP and consumption could increase by 0.5% to about 1% on 
average in Europe. The effects for the Member States vary depending on the 
size of the barriers in their services markets and specialization. These results 
take account of scale effects, and forward and backward linkages in the 
economy, but ignore the effects of more competition on productivity and 
innovation in the long term. This paper assesses the channels though which an 
integrated European services market may generate these dynamic gains. 
Improved market access will stimulate competitive selection and productivity 
growth. Through trade and investment, knowledge spillovers will increase and 
innovation will be fostered. These channels are illustrated with scarce 
quantitative evidence. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
 
The EC Treaty mentions ‘the freedom to provide services within the Community’ 
(art. 49) as one of its main objectives. Its realisation is still a far cry from 
present-day practice. Twenty years ago the Single Market Programme (SMP) 
was launched, meant to effectuate a free circulation of goods, services, capital 
and labour in an integrated European market. The services sector now accounts 
for almost 70 per cent of the European GDP and employment. But until 2004 it 
was kept in the waiting room for implementation of the SMP, and European 
services markets − including financial markets − remain highly fragmented. The 
European Commission then launched its proposals for a Directive on Services in 
the Internal Market (EC 2004). The topic sparked a remarkably intensive political 
debate in many of the ‘old’ EU countries. Unfortunately the SMP for services 
often appeared to be regarded as a zero-sum game, where countries either win 
or loose. The rejection of the Commission proposals by the European Council, in 
March 2005, was a painful setback for the SMP process. A factor may have been 
that the proposed Services Directive and the accession of ten new Member 
States approximately coincided in time, giving rise to labour immigration fears. 
In 2006, a political compromise was reached on a ‘light’ version of the original 
Services Directive proposals. 
 
The amended version of the Services Direction is to be implemented from 2010 
onwards (EC 2006). 2010 is also the benchmark year for the Lisbon targets, 
formulated to strengthen the competitiveness, productivity and innovation 
performance of the European economy. The Sapir Report (Sapir et al. 2004) 
singled out the extension of SMP to services as a top priority for raising the EU’s 
growth performance and international competitiveness. Labour productivity 
growth in the European services sector decreased in the 1990s relative to the 
1980s, and even more so in comparison with the USA (European Central Bank 
2006). O’Mahony et al. (2003) found that one of the main causes of the relative 
productivity slowdown in Europe compared to the United States is that European 
ICT-using services, like wholesale and retail, have a slower productivity growth 
than comparable sectors in the USA.  
 
The question is whether an open market for services in Europe could foster 
competition and productivity growth such that the productivity gap with the US 
can be diminished. This paper focuses on the relation between service market 
liberalisation, innovation and competitiveness. We single out the channels 
through which a more liberalised and intensive intra-European services trade 
can bolster productivity and innovation in the European economy. Up to now, 
most empirical studies −including our own− have quantified the static effects of 
services liberalisation, i.e. the shift effects that may occur as a result of a more 
integrated EU services market. What may even be more important are the 
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dynamic effects of liberalisation, because they may be a sustainable source of 
future productivity growth and innovation. This contribution is based on recent 
theoretical insights from trade theory, innovation theory, and on recent 
empirical findings on the European services economy.  
 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 presents some key statistics 
on the European services market. It also briefly discusses the regulatory 
obstacles that up to now constitute barriers to a more intensive intra-European 
services trade. Section 3 presents the main estimates of the static gains from 
services liberalisation. In Section 4 we assess the channels through which an 
integrated European services market in the future may generate dynamic 
welfare benefits for the Member States through more productivity and 
innovation. Valuable insights are derived from recent theory on trade with 
heterogeneous firms, and from the literature on competition and innovation. We 
present some of the still scarce quantitative evidence in this area. Section 5 
draws conclusions and singles out some policies that may support the 
attainment of dynamic welfare gains from more liberal services trade.  
2 A SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET FOR SERVICES? 
 
Commercial services represent some two-thirds of European economies and 
about 70 per cent of total employment. Despite press headlines on globalisation 
and offshoring of services jobs, services markets are still rather closed to foreign 
competition. Trade in commercial services is at most one-fifth of total world 
trade in goods and services. In value terms, world services exports now 
amounts to 2.4 trillion US dollars (WTO 2006). In 2005, world exports of 
commercial services rose by 11 per cent, while goods (merchandise) exports 
rose by 13 per cent. The gap between both is widening in recent years.  
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Personal and govt. 
services 4%
Travel
33 %
Insurance and 
finance 9 %
Royalties and 
licence fees 2%
Computer services 
5%
Construction 2%
Communication 3%
Other business 
services 23%
Transport
19 %
Table 2.1 The position of the internal EU market in the system of services 
trade between developed countries, 1999–2003. 
 
 EU services exports as % of 
OECD services exports 
Intra-EU services exports as % of 
total OECD services exports 
 1999 2003 1999 2003 
Total services 57 64   38 47       
of which:    
Royalties for technical services 31 28 a) 19 14 a) 
Other business services 56 64 a) 32 42 a) 
Commercial services without        
travel and transport 53    54 
a) 35 42 a) 
Note: a) 2002 data. 
 
Source: CPB consistent bilateral services trade matrices, developed on the basis of OECD 
data and the GTAP method for consistency of bilateral trade flows. Annual data in current 
US dollars. EU data have been calculated for EU25. 
 
The EU services exports have grown faster than the average for all developed 
countries. This holds for the EU’s external services exports and for exports in the 
internal EU services market. Table 2.1 shows that the shares of both in total 
OECD services exports have grown in recent years. This does not hold for the 
EU’s share in total royalty and license-fee receipts, used as a measure for 
exports of specific technical and high-valued-added services. Here, the EU 
seems to be loosing ground. Figure 2.1 shows the composition of intra-EU 
services trade. Travel is the largest category in services exports, before 
transport and business services. External and intra-EU services trade have a 
comparable sectoral composition.  
 
Figure 2.1  Share of services sectors in intra-EU services trade, 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: CPB consistent bilateral services trade matrices. The shaded components are 
most affected by the European Commission’s amended Services Directive (2006).  
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Compared to manufacturing and agriculture, services sectors are less open to 
international trade (details in Kox et al. 2004). This difference with the goods-
producing sectors has two basic causes.  
 
1. Services production and delivery often needs the proximity of producer and 
consumer, so that the services supplier has to move abroad.2 This makes 
cross-border trade relatively difficult compared to manufacturing where 
normally only the product is shipped abroad. If firms are large enough, they 
can choose between exporting and setting up a local establishment in the 
destination country. The share of foreign affiliates in services value added 
ranges from 7% in Denmark to nearly 40% in Ireland (OECD 2005). In the 
larger EU countries it is about 10% and in the accession countries it is much 
higher. Although recent FDI flows in services exceed those in 
manufacturing, the production share of foreign subsidiaries in manufacturing 
is still higher than in services. 
 
2. Regulation-caused non-tariff barriers form a further cause for the limited 
international integration of services markets. The European Commission (EC 
2002a) found a wide array of domestic measures that hamper service firms 
in supplying a foreign market through cross-border trade or foreign 
establishments. Regulations for service suppliers, for foreign investors and 
for the service products themselves often are primarily established for 
domestic purposes without taking account of the interests of foreign service 
providers. 
 
The fact that a national service market is regulated need not in itself be a 
barrier to international services trade.3 This can be shown by a little thought 
experiment. Suppose that all countries have the same type of regulation, for 
instance, a qualification requirement for providers producing a particular service 
product. Since qualification costs are mainly fixed costs, it would cost an 
exporting firm a one-off effort to comply with the qualification criteria. Once 
having incurred these fixed qualification costs, the firm would even have an 
incentive to export more. By enlarging its production through exports into other 
countries, the firm could reap economies of scale. However, such a uniform 
system of regulation for service markets does not exist. Countries often have 
little interest in each other’s regulatory regimes or have little confidence in its 
quality. Hence, they are reluctant to adapt their own regimes where necessary 
to facilitate cross-border activities. If each country has different regulations in 
place and does not recognise qualifications in a foreign firm’s home country, 
then the national qualification costs become cumulative fixed costs. Because the 
                                               
2  In the case of tourism and travel, the consumers moves abroad. 
3    Even though regulations may have a negative bearing on competition and domestic market 
entry. The European Central Bank (2006) found that services prices rose more in those EU 
countries that have stricter regulations (barriers to entrepreneurship). 
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All services
Traded Non-traded, not SD-covered
- Government services 
- Health, education
- Localised services (haircut)
Non regulated, covered by 
SD
- Tourism
- Wholesale trade
- Consultancy & analysis
- Voluntary tests, certifying
- Data processing 
- Software 
- Logistics
- Market research
- Simple cleaning
Network services
Post, telecom, gas, water & 
electricity distribution, rail, 
airports, broadcasting
Regulated, not covered by SDRegulated, covered by SD
Other EU regulatory frames
Banking, insurance, road & sea 
transport, investment
- Professional services
- Advertising, cleaning, 
- Engineering, architects
- Entertainment, audiovisual 
- Construction 
- Recruitment 
- Hotels, cafes, restaurants 
- Retail trade
- Obligatory tests,certifying 
- Repair, maintenance
costs are country-specific, they are in fact sunk market-entry cost for a country 
market. This hampers exports and investment. 
 
The Services Directive introduced by the European Commission intends to make 
headway with Single European Market for Services, by reducing the negative 
impact of policy heterogeneity, by ruling out national measures that explicitly or 
implicitly discriminate against foreign service supplies, and by calling for 
measures facilitating trade and investment in services. Figure 2.2 tentatively 
shows the sectoral coverage of the Services Directive. The regulated services 
sectors are the ones which are most affected by the directive. Combining the 
information of figures 2.1 and 2.2 we may conclude that from a quantitative 
perspective the SD first and foremost covers the intra-European trade in 
business-to-business services. These services correspond in particular to what 
Baldwin (2006) calls the ’second wave of unbundling’.  
 
Figure 2.2  Sectoral coverage of Services Directive (SD), as amended in 2006. 
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3 STATIC EFFECTS OF EU SERVICES MARKET 
LIBERALISATION 
 
Until shortly, very few studies were available that quantify the potential impact 
of lower service-trade barriers in the EU internal market. An early study by 
Buigues et al. (1990) simulated strong effects of the European Single Market 
programme, but hardly paid attention to services. With its ambitious and far-
reaching 2004 proposals for a Services Directive (EC 2004), the European 
Commission wants to accomplish a European Single Market for a large part of 
the services sector. The proposals would eliminate important obstacles to the 
freedom of establishment and the free movement of services, while 
strengthening mutual trust between the EU countries on their regulatory 
regimes. Using the 2004 Commission proposals for a Services Directive (SD) as 
a point of departure, several studies have quantified the potential effects of the 
proposed measures. Here we just summarise their main results. 
 
Kox and Lejour (2005, 2006) approach the issue by quantifying the sunk 
market-entry costs of country-specific regulations, accounting for differences in 
product-market regulations between each EU country pair.4 The degree of 
bilateral policy heterogeneity between countries is used as a proxy for sunk 
export costs; it may differ between each pair of countries. Applied in gravity 
equations for bilateral services trade in the EU, regulatory heterogeneity in 
policy areas like competition and trade regulation appears to have a robustly 
negative trade impact. At detailed level they subsequently estimate to what 
extent the Commission's SD would affect bilateral policy heterogeneity. The 
results are combined to simulate the effects of the SD:  
• trade in commercial services (excluding transport and travel) could 
increase by 30 to 62 per cent; 
• intra-EU FDI in services could increase by 18 to 36 per cent. 
 
In order to estimate the macro-economic importance of the SD, De Bruijn et al. 
(2006) have fed the estimated trade impacts (not the FDI effects) into a large 
CGE model WorldScan which distinguishes most of the EU countries:  
• average European consumption could increase by between 0.5 and 
1.2 per cent; 
• the mutual-recognition element in the Service Directive, i.e. the country-
of-origin principle (or shortly: CoOP) accounts for about one-third of the 
effects. 
 
                                               
4   Using country-wise data on some 200 different items in product-market regulations from the 
OECD International Regulation database. The indicator is decomposed into 5 different areas of 
product-market regulation. 
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If also the effects of more FDI are added (derived from Lejour et al. 2006) 
consumption could increase by 0.5 to 1.5 per cent. Frame 3.1 explains why 
these macro-economic effects seem relatively modest. However, expressed in 
terms of the 2004 European GDP, the measures would add 35 to 95 billion 
Euros. This still ignores the productivity and innovation impacts of more trade 
and FDI. 
 
Frame 3.1  Putting services-liberalisation in the size perspective of the EU economy 
 
The Services Directive may increase the intra-EU volume of trade in other commercial 
services by 30 to 62 per cent (De Bruijn et al. 2006). This is a very strong increase for 
the services sectors involved. But a backside-of-envelop calculation shows that the effect 
at a macroeconomic level is much more modest. Intra-EU trade in other commercial 
services represents only about seven per cent of total EU trade. The 2004 Services 
Directive would thus increase total EU trade by some 2 to 5 per cent. Detailed simulation 
results at country level support this intuition. Given the small effects on total trade, it is 
not surprising that the static GDP effects are modest, on average ranging from 0.3 per 
cent to 0.7 per cent in the EU. 
 
Breuss and Badinger (2005) use CPB’s quantitative estimates of the SD’s 
services-trade effects as input for their research. They estimate how much the 
additional trade will erode profit mark-ups in EU services markets. They find that 
more entry does not directly affect productivity, but for the sample of service 
industries covered by SD, they find significant effects of trade on more 
competition. And the latter has significant positive impacts on productivity, 
employment and investment in EU services.  
 
Copenhagen Economics (2005a, 2005b) analyses the welfare effects of the EU 
proposals with a CGE model which also considers the FDI effects. They assess 
that overall consumption in the European Union would increase by 0.6 per cent. 
This estimate corresponds to the minimum estimate by De Bruijn et al. (2006). 
According to their analysis the CoOP contributes only about 10 per cent to the 
total welfare effects (including the FDI-induced effects). This is not surprising, 
since their concept of non-tariff barriers in services is more limited: they look at 
domestic regulation within a country, but do not consider the impacts of inter-
country differences in the form and content of the regulations. 
 
Vogt (2005) considers the estimates of Copenhagen Economics to be 
conservative, because all dynamic effects of extra competition on productivity 
and innovation are left unconsidered. It is however fair to say that this criticism 
also holds for the CPB studies. Both studies concentrate on the static (one-off) 
effects of opening up European services markets: economies of scale, efficiency 
gains through inter-sector supply linkages.  
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The estimates of the static gains of opening up services market are comparable 
to the effects of the SMP in 1992. In 2002 the European Commission (EC, 
2002b) has estimated that GDP in the EU is about 1.4% higher due to SMP. The 
GDP increase mostly derives from the increased allocative efficiency in 
manufacturing. Moreover the liberalisation of network industries increases GDP 
by another 0.4%. The dynamic effects and integration of services sectors are 
not estimated.  
4 DYNAMIC EFFECTS OF LIBERALISATION 
 
What can we say about the dynamic welfare gains of more intra-European trade 
and FDI in services, i.e. their impact on productivity growth and innovation, the 
basic sources of future economic growth? These dynamic effects are certainly 
more difficult to quantify than the static effects. The main channels for long-
term dynamic impacts are: (a) more competitive selection; (b) knowledge spill-
overs; and (c) market entry as incentive for innovation. We discuss each of 
these channels and present relevant pieces of empirical evidence. 
4.1 Competitive selection 
 
Theory and empirics on the relation between (foreign) competition, innovation 
and productivity growth are still in their early stages. Some clues on the 
dynamic impact of SD on productivity and growth can be found in the literature 
on the relation between trade openness and income growth. The empirical 
relationship between openness and income is subject to debate.5 Some 
influential papers estimate that 1 percentage point more trade openness causes 
income to grow by 0.6 per cent in the short term, and 1.1 per cent when also 
long-term effects are counted (Frankel and Rose; 2002). Applying the latter 
estimate, the 2004 Services Directive could increase European GDP by 2 to 5 per 
cent. These long-run effects incorporate the effects of extra competition, 
productivity spill-overs, extra innovation and productivity growth. Nicoletti and 
Scarpetta (2003) estimate that entry liberalisation in services could boost 
productivity growth by 0.1 to 0.2 per cent in some European countries. Less 
product market regulation may stimulate firm entry, investment and the growth 
of firms. 
 
                                               
5    Cf. Feenstra (2003: Ch. 10) for a review. 
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Aghion and Griffith (2005) attempt to provide a unified and coherent account of 
the effects that competition and deregulated entry have on economic growth.6 
They sketch two opposing forces that are at work. One factor is that more 
competition may reduce the monopoly rents that reward successful innovators; 
too much competition would then be bad for innovation and growth. The other 
force is that more competition generates incentives for firms to work more 
efficiently, and thus generate − as is corroborated by some empirical studies− a 
higher productivity growth. Aghion and Griffith propose a distinction between 
'competition for markets' (capturing market entry and the ability of escaping 
current markets by creating new market opportunities) from 'competition in 
markets' (traditional cost competition in product markets). After increased or 
imminent competitive entry in their market, incumbent firms will innovate again 
to escape competition. The incentive to innovate for new firms may become 
lower, however, because the potential rewards from successful innovation get 
smaller. 
 
This insight can be applied to European services markets. The foreign firms that 
enter the domestic markets of other EU Member States are not new firms, but 
incumbents in their home market. Due to liberalisation, these incumbents do not 
leave their home markets but create new, additional market opportunities in 
other countries. The overall effect is that in all EU countries cost competition 
between incumbents increases in existing product markets.7 It will raise the 
average productivity level. The incumbent firms will react by innovating into new 
product markets or by carving out niche markets. More foreign presence means 
that buyers have a larger choice variety to choose from. The entry hurdle and 
innovation incentive for new domestic firms may however become higher. 
Accompanying policies may be required to address this potential problem. 
 
Griffith et al. (2006) analyse the impact that the Single Market Programme had 
on competition and subsequently innovation and productivity growth. They find 
that the programme had effects that are statistically and economically 
significant. In manufacturing, competition increased, as measured by profit 
mark-ups. This stimulated productivity growth, and it also fostered investment in 
R&D by existing firms. For services, they find that more competition goes along 
with more productivity growth, but due to statistical deficiencies they cannot 
establish the causality direction between both. 
 
                                               
6     Earlier work by Aghion et al. (2003) includes some empirical support derived from manufacturing 
industries, but overall the empirics on the subject still are limited. For manufacturing, more and 
better statistical data on competition, innovation and productivity are available than for services. 
More European support for this type of research seems warranted, therefore. 
7   The extent to which competition will increase depends partly on the substitution between exports 
and FDI. Recent theory predicts that exports will increase more than FDI when liberalisation 
causes fixed market-entry costs to fall. Evidence from manufacturing industry supports this 
(Helpman et al. 2004).  
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Frame 4.1  Fixed-cost impact of exports and local establishment in business services 
 
A survey study commissioned by the European Commission provides some information on 
the magnitude of fixed market-entry costs (CSES 2001). Among a large number of 
business-services firms in the EU, 78 per cent of the firms mention that setup costs of 
selling services in other EU states are "significant" or “very significant” trading barriers. 
Of those firms that were able to estimate the size of the setup costs, 30 per cent 
estimated that these are in the order of 3–6 months sales proceeds, and 43 per cent 
estimated that the cost are more than 6 months of sales proceeds. The setup-cost effects 
are largest for small and medium-sized enterprises (SME): "Evidence collected from SMEs 
and SME-supporting organisations suggests that many SMEs back off after initial inquiries 
about administrative requirements and procedures because they feel they do not have 
the necessary resources to deal with the current complexity". 
 
Scarpetta et al. (2002) conclude that stringent regulatory settings in the product 
market have a negative bearing on productivity and on market access. The 
largest impact of national product market regulations is on small and medium-
sized enterprises. Only firms with sufficient size are able to overcome the fixed 
market-entry costs caused by national regulation (cf. Frame 4.1). Because of the 
country-specific character of most regulations, regulation-caused qualification 
costs for individual firms are sunk costs, specific for each export market. In a 
situation with fragmented services markets and high sunk export cost, only the 
largest or the most productive service firms can be expected to export.  
 
The newest trade theory explicitly models and explains the impact of trade 
liberalisation in the case of heterogeneous firms (e.g. Melitz 2003; Baldwin 
2005; Yeaple 2005; Helpman et al. 2006). These models explain a well-
documented fact, namely that only the most productive firms are active in 
exports. They put particular emphasis on the role of sunk export costs. They 
also show that liberalisation causes exports of firms in all size classes to 
increase, but that the firms that newly embark on exports are smaller than 
before. If liberalisation (or mutual recognition) lowers entry costs, more and 
smaller firms will be able to export profitably. Especially firms from the ranks of 
the medium-sized services firms will start exporting. A further finding is that the 
average productivity level will increase due to the liberalisation, because 
relatively productive foreign firms gain market share at the expense of those 
domestic firms that are less efficient. 
 
These findings may have a direct relevance for intra-European services trade. 
Looking to the relation between firm size and labour productivity among a very 
large sample of European business-services firms, Kox et al. (2007) find that 
medium-sized firms tend to have a higher than average labour productivity. The 
left panel of Figure 4.1 shows a hump-shape relation (inverted-U) between size 
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and productivity in six out of eleven EU countries.8 While sunk export costs 
resulting from country-specific regulation requirements give large firms an 
advantage in intra-European exports, Figure 4.1 shows that these are not 
necessarily the most productive ones. If liberalisation lowers regulation-caused 
export costs, it is likely to cause more export by medium-sized firms. This may 
have a positive impact on overall productivity in services. Expanding the foreign 
markets opportunities for SMEs may thus generate welfare-enhancing scale and 
productivity effects. Empirical research finds firms that newly enter a market 
(like the newly exporting SME firms) to be more likely than incumbent firms to 
pass on productivity advantages through lower prices (Foster et al. 2005). 
 
Figure 4.1  Relative labour productivity in business services by size class, 11 
EU countries, 1999 (Benchmark: productivity in size class of 50–
99 employees). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: labour productivity is measured as value added (in 1000 Euros) per employed person. Legends for 
firm-size classes, based on employed persons per firm: a) 1-4; b) 5-9; c) 10-19; d) 20-49; e) 50-99; f) 
100-249; g) 250-499; h) 500-999; and i) over 1000 employed persons. The value added of the size class 
with 50-99 employed persons is the benchmark (=1).  
Data source: Eurostat, New Cronos, Figure from Kox et al. (2007).  
 
We estimated that the EU Services Directive could increase intra-EU FDI in 
services by 20 to 35 per cent (Kox and Lejour 2006). This will also raise average 
productivity and GDP growth. Several studies show that establishments of 
multinational service firms are often more productive than domestic services 
firms.9 In Figure 4.2 we specifically look at the productivity gap in those sectors 
                                               
8  The right panel moreover indicates that in two more Member States (Sweden and Ireland), 
average labour productivity increases with size. 
9   E.g. Griffith et al. (2004); Hoekman and Javorcik (2005); OECD (2005) shows that foreign 
affiliates in services are on average more (labour) productive than the average firm in the host 
country. 
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that are central in the Services Directive, namely business services, computer-
related services and the trade/distribution sector. The oval shape in Figure 4.2 
indicates that the productivity advantage of foreign affiliates is largest in the 
distribution sector that often still is strongly dominated by domestic firms. Note 
that O’Mahony et al. (2003) found this sector to account for a large part of the 
EU-USA gap in productivity growth. Due to the Services Directive, foreign 
affiliates will gain market share at the expense of those domestic firms that are 
less productive, which will lift average productivity. 
 
Figure 4.2  Productivity gap between domestic firms and foreign affiliates in 
selected services sectors, 5 EU countries, 1997–1998. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: If the dots are above the line foreign affiliates have a higher labour productivity than domestic 
firms in that industry. Productivity is measured as value added per employed person.  
Source: calculated from OECD STAN and OECD FATS databases.  
4.2 Knowledge spill-overs 
 
Deeper services market integration facilitates knowledge spill-overs. 
International trade contacts stimulate the exchange of ideas and knowledge. As 
was noted before, business services is the main sector affected by the EU 
Services Directive. It is a services sector that plays a crucial role in both 
knowledge diffusion and in innovation (Rubalcaba et al.. 2007). An IMF study by 
Guerrieri et al. (2005) stresses the important role of business services in 
knowledge accumulation and growth. They find a strong statistical relation 
between international knowledge spillovers −as measured by bilateral patent 
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citations− and trade in knowledge-intensive business services. They use an 
econometric model that can accommodate dynamic effects of service-trade 
liberalisation. Their simulations suggest that output growth could become about 
1 per cent higher due to liberalisation over a period of ten years.  
 
From a vast amount of literature, Hoekman and Javorcik (2005) infer that 
services providers could be important in transferring knowledge, and that trade 
and FDI could be important in services sectors as source of knowledge. UNCTAD 
(2004) concludes that systematic evidence on the extent of transfer and 
dissemination of knowledge, expertise and skills by services multinationals is 
limited. There is proof that these firms train their employees, and that 
consultancy firms improve management practices in client firms. However, the 
empirical literature has largely ignored the services sectors so far. 
4.3 Market entry as incentive for innovation 
 
As mentioned before, several studies indicate that a tougher competitive 
selection process due to liberalisation could trigger services firms to innovate 
more rapidly, in order to distinguish themselves from competitors. So, apart 
from strengthening the spill-overs of existing knowledge, liberalisation may also 
induce new, original innovations, thereby stimulating productivity growth and 
future welfare (Nickell 1996; Aghion ret al. 2005). Innovation can be a way to 
escape competition for service firms if the post-innovation rents (with new 
market opportunities) exceed the pre-innovation rents (imminent erosion of 
profits due to strong market entry). However, the empirical evidence on the 
innovation effects of more market entry in services is still under-researched.  
5 CONCLUSION AND POSSIBLE POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
Services markets in Europe are fragmented and labour productivity performance 
is relatively weak. The available studies on the impact of the European Services 
Directive have shown that the measures will generate more intra-European 
trade in services, more foreign direct investment in services sectors, and lower 
prices of services. As a consequence, consumption and income will increase, and 
possibly also employment in Europe. These effects are static gains, in the sense 
that they represent a one-off shift in economic performance. Most of these static 
gains will probably materialise in the medium term −say five to seven years after 
implementation. 
 
These static gains are considerable in themselves. For the economic future of 
the EU it is even more important what the accomplishment of the Internal 
Market for Services implies for future welfare. What does the integration of the 
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EU services markets mean for labour productivity growth, for innovation, and for 
the European capacity to adjust in a world where −with or without Internal 
Services Market− manufacturing and services activities will increasingly be 
sourced globally rather than regionally or nationally? These dynamic effects 
potentially have a larger and longer-lasting impact on the European economy, 
although they will materialise less quickly than the static gains of service-market 
liberalisation. 
 
The upshot from the available evidence that we reviewed in this paper is that 
the prime dynamic gains from services liberalisation will come from more new 
market entry by firms based in other EU countries. Improved market access will 
subsequently stimulate competitive selection and productivity growth. 
Competitive selection will lift average productivity, bolster the role of SME firms 
in exports, intensify knowledge spill-overs, and strengthen innovation by 
incumbent firms. Moreover, increased FDI in liberalised services markets will 
also increase average productivity. This can be expected to be beneficial for the 
number of available service varieties, for service quality, and for the price of 
services. Domestic firms will have more choice options with regard to their 
service providers. This also includes their freedom to choose for cheaper foreign 
supply options. As a general result, the international competitiveness of non-
service industries will be strengthened.10  
 
The overall welfare gains will be positive for the EU, and it may go along with a 
reallocation process in which countries specialise in the products where they 
have the largest advantages. This is illustrated in Frame 5.1. It is normal that 
industry reallocations go along with ‘local pains’. Those that stand to loose are 
those domestic firms that have a low efficiency, and that fail to innovate into 
new market opportunities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
10  According a study by the European Central Bank (2006): “a higher level of competition in the 
services sector would tend to support more efficient and flexible services markets, facilitate 
adjustment processes and increase the resilience of the euro area to economic shocks”. 
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Frame 5.1  Industry reallocations between Member States due to Services Directive  
 
According to the CPB study (De Bruijn et al. 2006), industry reallocation will follow after 
implementing the Services Directive. We concluded that the Member States in Central 
and Eastern Europe will see a relatively large increase in services imports, but will be 
more than compensated by a relatively large export in manufacturing products. Countries 
like Germany and the UK will loose terrain in manufacturing value added, but gain in 
services exports. For a country like Poland it is the other way around. Their domestic 
value added in other commercial services diminishes due to more imports, because the 
country is not competitive enough in this area, but their gains are in manufacturing 
where they have the largest comparative advantage. The total gains, both in value added 
and in exports, are positive for all EU countries. It shows that a complex operation as the 
Internal Market for Services cannot adequately be interpreted as a simple zero-sum 
game.  
 
Lowering national regulatory differences between Member States means that 
the sunk export costs for individual services firms will fall. This will attract new 
layers of particularly the more productive medium-sized firms to embark on 
exporting to other EU Member States. An integrated market for services will 
benefit SMEs. The burden of red tape is also more ponderous for SMEs than big 
firms, because many of the related costs are fixed costs and therefore hardly 
related to firm size. 
 
Even with the 2006 Services Directive, the Single Market Programme (SMP) for 
services is still far from accomplished. First, the directive covers only a fraction 
of the services industries. European markets for financial services are still highly 
fragmented along national borders. Also in network services (telecom, utilities, 
rail, airlines) and transport national markets are only partially integrated. 
Second, the present Services Directive can only be considered as a first step for 
those service sectors that are covered by the directive.  
 
The EU can reduce the costs that internationally operating firms experience due 
to national policy differences in the EU through two mechanisms: harmonisation 
or mutual recognition. In the latter case foreign firms are allowed to operate 
under regulatory standards of their home country. Harmonisation is a very long 
and complex process, and it may not even be efficient because countries may 
have different market preconditions or different regulatory preferences. A wider 
application of the mutual-recognition principle may be the most auspicious 
policy track. This approach was originally chosen by the European Commission 
in its 2004 proposals, with the country-of origin principle as the fundamental 
instrument. In the amended 2006 version this principle has been watered down 
to a vague and redundant formula (‘the freedom to provide services’) that was 
already laid down in the EC Treaty. Many national exemptions are allowed, thus 
undermining transparency for individual services firms. At the time, given the 
heavy debate in some countries, this was perhaps the maximum feasible 
political compromise. Our studies suggest that from the perspective of the SMP 
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the watered-down Services Directive is just a first step that still leaves -so to 
speak- many 50 Euro notes lying on the sidewalk for being picked up later. 
Further steps come in reach as soon as there is enough mutual trust and 
stability in the relations between Member States, because this is essential for 
adopting the mutual recognition approach. Our results further suggest that trade 
and foreign direct investment in services could be boosted, if also the level of 
regulation is limited. 
 
Meanwhile, more trade openness in European service markets will increase 
competition, it may in some service sectors go along with the exit of the less 
efficient national services firms. Rather than putting a brake on this reallocation 
process, it may be useful to strengthen the role of accompanying policies that 
address and mollify the transitional costs of adapting domestic sectors to these 
side effects of liberalisation. Such policies may include areas like social insurance 
against involuntary loss of jobs, a bankruptcy law that enables more exit 
flexibility, and re-education (cf. Andersen 2006; Davidson et al. 2006). Another 
type of policies that may accompany services liberalisation concerns the 
incentive for innovation by new services firms. The entry hurdle and innovation 
incentive for new domestic firms may however become higher. The failure rate 
and also self-selection for small domestic firms will increase. Though this effect 
will not be catastrophic, EU governments could opt for start-up premiums in 
order to compensate for the reduced start-up incentive for potential innovators. 
Finally, improved accessibility of venture capital for small and medium-sized 
firms may also work out beneficial for the number of start-ups. 
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